

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE  
ON DISARMAMENT

OF MICHIGAN  
NOV 20 1968

ENDC/PV.381  
16 July 1968  
ENGLISH

---

DOCUMENT  
COLLECTION

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-FIRST MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,  
on Tuesday, 16 July 1968, at 2.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

(Ethiopia)

68-18550

GE.68-12967

## PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. A.F. AZEREDO da SILVEIRA

Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES

Mr. LUIZ F.P. LAMPREIA

Mr. J. NOGUEIRA FILHO

Bulgaria:

Mr. K. CHRISTOV

Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV

Burma:

U CHIT MYAING

U KYAW MIN

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS

Mr. A.G. CAMPBELL

Mr. J.R. MORDEN

Mr. A. BERNIER

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. T. LAHODA

Mr. R. KLEIN

Mr. J. STRUCKA

Ethiopia:

Mr. A. ZELLEKE

Mr. G. ALULA

India:

Mr. M.A. HUSAIN

Mr. N. KRISHNAN

Mr. R. BHANDARI

Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:

Mr. R. CARACCILOLO

Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI

Mr. R. BERLENGHI

Mexico:

Mr. J. CASTANEDA  
Mr. H. CARDENAS RODRIGUEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. B.O. TONWE

Poland:

Mr. H. JAROSZEK  
Mr. E. STANIEWSKI  
Mr. H. STEPOSZ  
Mr. S. DABROWA

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO  
Mr. O. IONESCO  
Mr. C. GEORGESCO  
Mr. V. TARZIORU

Sweden:

Mrs. A. MYRDAL  
Mr. A. EDELSTAM  
Mr. U. ERICSSON  
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist  
Republics:

Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN  
Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV  
Mr. M.P. SHELEPIN  
Mr. I.M. PALENYKH

United Arab Republic:

Mr. O. SIRRY  
Mr. A. ELREEDY  
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

The Rt. Hon. F. MULLEY  
Mr. I.F. PORTER  
Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY  
Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER

Mr. G. BUNN

Mr. S. GRAYBEAL

Mr. C. GLEYSTEN

Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative of the  
Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

Director-General of the United  
Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. V. WINSPEARE GUICCIARDI

Deputy Director-General of the  
United Nations Office at Geneva:

Mr. G. PALTHEY

1. The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I declare open the 381st plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. In accordance with established practice on the resumption of the work of the Conference, the first part of this meeting will be open. I call on Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. Mr. PROTITCH (Special Representative of the Secretary-General): On behalf of Secretary-General U Thant, I have the privilege of welcoming once again to the United Nations Office at Geneva the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. I have also the honour to convey to the Conference the following message from the Secretary-General:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is reconvening in Geneva at a time when negotiations on disarmament and arms limitations are showing significant movement and encouraging progress. The successful conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is the culmination of ten years of efforts in the General Assembly and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. More than sixty States have already signed it. This is an achievement of which the Eighteen-Nation Committee can rightly be proud, having regard to its major contribution in making the treaty a reality. I am confident that, if the treaty is accepted by as many States as possible and if its provisions are faithfully implemented, it will become a landmark in the long and difficult road to disarmament.

"One of the essential provisions of the non-proliferation treaty is that concerning further measures of disarmament. General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII), the text of which is before you, requests the Conference and the nuclear-weapon States

'... urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.'

This is also the language of article VI of the treaty itself, which, for the first time in history, imposes a multilateral legal obligation on the States parties to the treaty to pursue nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.

(Mr. Protitch)

"I was deeply gratified by the positive statements made by the leaders of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and of the United States on matters concerning disarmament, following the conclusion of the non-proliferation treaty. These statements, I believe, have not only improved the prospects for further measures to control the nuclear arms race, but also give rise to hopes for improvement in the international political climate and for the relaxation of international tension.

"Taking advantage of these favourable elements in the situation, the Committee must now strive to open a new and fruitful chapter in disarmament negotiations. I feel certain that the Committee will take up this task energetically and with the highest sense of responsibility. The success you have achieved thus far makes it not only possible but extremely desirable that it is followed soon by additional measures of disarmament.

"The Conference has on its agenda a number of items of unfinished business as well as some previous resolutions of the General Assembly to which it has not been able to devote its full attention. This resumed session of the Conference will enable the members of the Committee to consider these matters as well as any new items which may be raised. The Conference has a function of prime importance in exploring these questions and in selecting those which are most important and most amenable to early agreement. The Conference can thus chart the way to further progress along new directions.

"The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament provides an effective forum for harmonizing the responsibilities of the great Powers with the interests of other countries. On this occasion, when the Eighteen-Nation Committee is called to resume its challenging task, I wish to extend to it my best wishes for success in its endeavours."

3. The CHAIRMAN (Ethiopia): I am sure I speak for all the members of the Committee in requesting Mr. Protitch to convey to the Secretary-General our thanks for the kind words and good wishes in his message to the Conference.

(The Chairman, Ethiopia)

4. With your permission I should now like to say a few words as Chairman of today's meeting. It is, of course, a great honour for me and my country to preside over today's meeting.

5. May I first of all welcome the new Under-Secretary-General and Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi. In the second place may I welcome back all the old members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament whose familiar faces give this Committee a sense of continuity and a feeling of confidence of an accumulated experience and knowledge, that is no doubt indispensable to the success of the work we are entrusted to carry out.

6. The discussions and negotiations in this Committee have many times been enriched by the arrival of new members and leaders of delegations whose knowledge and experience elsewhere have always brought a new insight and outlook and a depth of thought into the complicated problems of our work. It is therefore with great pleasure that I welcome to this Committee all the newcomers, and particularly Ambassador Myaing, the leader of the Burmese delegation; Ambassador Jaroszek, the leader of the Polish delegation, and Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira of Brazil and Ambassador Castañeda of Mexico, who have come back after a short absence to lead their delegations.

7. Finally, may I also welcome back Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative. Their presence amongst us today shows, as always, the great interest of the world community in our work.

8. The session which we are now opening is, I believe, of particular significance. It is a session which may begin a new chapter in the history of the work of our Committee. Unlike our previous sessions, this is one where our meetings begin in an atmosphere of achievement and in a spirit of great optimism for further success in our work. Two or three years ago no one could have expected this Committee to produce a tangible result in the form of a concrete treaty such as the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/226) which was successfully achieved a few months ago. There is no doubt that it was the almost stubborn persistence and untiring labour of the Committee as a whole which led to the crowning success, the finalization of the treaty.

(The Chairman, Ethiopia)

9. However, we must not forget that what we have achieved is not an end: it is merely a beginning, the beginning of a long and perhaps even more difficult journey towards nuclear sanity in the world. We are now resolved to continue vigorously and in good faith the negotiations on further measures of nuclear disarmament. And to that extent our tasks and responsibilities are even more binding upon us than at any previous time. Given the will and experience of hard work there is no doubt that this Committee is bound to succeed.

10. We have now concluded the open part of this meeting. We shall have a five-minute recess, after which the Committee will resume its work in private.

The meeting was suspended at 2.55 p.m. and resumed at 3 p.m.

11. Mr. ROSHCIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): First of all permit me, on behalf of my delegation, to join in welcoming all the members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and also to congratulate the newly appointed representatives in the Committee: Ambassador Jaroszek of Poland and Ambassador Myaing of Burma. We should also like to welcome the return to our midst of the representative of Brazil, Ambassador Azeredo da Silveira, and the representative of Mexico, Ambassador Castañeda. We welcome here the Director-General of the United Nations Office at Geneva, Mr. Winspeare Guicciardi, and wish him success in his new high position. We also welcome the representative of the Secretary-General, Mr. Protitch, and his deputy, Mr. Epstein, and the staff of the Secretariat, which is discharging a very useful function that contributes to the carrying out of the work entrusted to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

12. After those words of welcome, Mr. Chairman, may we make the following statement now that the Eighteen-Nation Committee is resuming its work.

13. Today the Committee is resuming consideration of one of the most important international problems of the day, that of disarmament. Since the Committee adjourned on 14 March last a substantial advance has taken place in the solution of one problem of disarmament, that of the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. On 12 June the resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly approved by an overwhelming majority a treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, the draft of which was agreed upon basically in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. The



(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

General Assembly requested the depositary governments to open the treaty for signature and ratification at the earliest possible date and expressed the hope for the widest possible adherence to the treaty by States in the world. On 1 July the treaty was opened for signature in Moscow, Washington and London. Up to the present time the treaty has been signed by more than sixty States. We express the hope that it will soon be signed and ratified by the overwhelming majority of States in the world.

14. The signing of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons by many States is an important event which will play a great role in the development of international co-operation between States in the interests of strengthening peace and security and of moving further towards the end of the arms race and towards disarmament.

15. The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, Mr. Kosygin, speaking on the day of the signing of the treaty by the Soviet Union in Moscow, declared:

"The conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is a great success on behalf of peace. From the moment when nuclear weapons first appeared the Soviet Union has firmly and consistently striven to free mankind from the nuclear menace. The treaty is an important step towards this objective since it sets up a barrier against the further dissemination of nuclear weapons and thus reduces the danger of unleashing a nuclear war."

16. After the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the Treaty concerning the principles governing the activities of governments in outer space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI)), the conclusion of an international agreement on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons represents the practical accomplishment of one of the most important measures for ending the arms race. The achievement of such an agreement, supported by the majority of States, shows convincingly that there are in these days real possibilities of mutually acceptable solutions of complex problems of vital importance to mankind relating to the cessation of the arms race and to disarmament. The elaboration and conclusion of the treaty on the

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is further evidence of the fact that the will of the peoples of the world for peace is stronger than the opposition of those who count on an acceleration of the nuclear arms race, those who try to block the way towards the easing of international tension. The creation of a barrier against the further dissemination of nuclear weapons throughout the world will be an important contribution towards preventing a nuclear war and strengthening general peace.

17. The Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament in resuming its negotiations is now entering a new stage of work. The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons is regarded by the Soviet Union as one of the first important steps towards the accomplishment of measures in the field of nuclear and general disarmament. This treaty paves the way for the solution of other urgent problems of disarmament. It is necessary to bend every effort in order to make further progress towards slowing down the arms race and towards disarmament in order to achieve the conclusion of further international agreements in this field.

18. The urgent need for the immediate accomplishment of further measures aimed at restricting the arms race and at disarmament is dictated by the existing tense international situation and by the dangers inherent in the arms race, particularly the nuclear arms race. Dangerous hotbeds of international conflict continue to exist in various parts of the world, and in Viet-Nam the flames of a war are still raging, about which we have repeatedly stated our views. A dangerous situation continues in the Near East, where Israel continues to occupy territories seized by force from several Arab States. Serious concern is aroused among the peoples of the world by the activities of certain forces in West Germany and the resurgence there of neo-Nazis circles.

19. The arms race continues at an ever faster pace. The member States of NATO continue to throw into the furnace of military preparations more and more resources aimed at creating new devastating weapons for waging war. Thus, the expenditure of the United States for military needs during the present budgetary year amounts to \$80,000 million. For the next financial year the Pentagon has asked for a record United States military budget of \$102,000 million --- that is, over \$20,000 million more than in the present year.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

20. The pace of the arms race is accelerating also in West Germany. Thus between 1949 and the end of 1967 the Federal Republic of Germany spent 152,000 million marks for military purposes. In accordance with the financial plans of the State the military expenditure of West Germany will increase between 1968 and 1971. Plans are also being worked out to increase the strength of the Bundeswehr.

21. It is quite obvious that in order to stop the arms race most urgent and effective measures must be taken to achieve disarmament and to channel into peaceful uses the enormous resources now being used for military preparations. In the present international situation agreements in the field of disarmament which would make it possible to put an end to the dangerous arms race and which would protect the peoples from the threat of a nuclear war would be extremely important.

22. The resumed twenty-second session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, which approved by an overwhelming majority the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, expressed its conviction that

"...an agreement to prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons must be followed as soon as possible by effective measures on the cessation of the nuclear arms race and on nuclear disarmament, and that the non-proliferation treaty will contribute to this aim." (General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII)), (ENDC/226).

In this connexion, the General Assembly requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and the nuclear-weapon States

"... urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control". (ibid.)

The treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons itself directly provides for an undertaking on the part of its signatories to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures in the field of disarmament.

23. The position of the Soviet Union on questions relating to nuclear and general and complete disarmament is well known. The Soviet Government is in favour of taking the most radical measures in this field, since it regards the struggle for disarmament as one of the most important directions of the foreign policy of the Soviet State.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

24. The Secretary-General of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the USSR, Leonid Ilytch Brezhnev, in a speech on 3 July this year, said:

"One of the main components of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, as of other socialist countries, is the struggle for the cessation of the arms race and to free mankind from the threat of a world nuclear war."

25. Guided by the fundamental aim of the foreign policy of the Soviet State -- the strengthening of peace throughout the world -- the Government of the USSR, on 1 July of this year, addressed to all States a memorandum on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament. On the instructions of the Government of the USSR, the Soviet delegation today presents this memorandum to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament and requests that it be circulated as a Conference document. <sup>1/</sup> We take this opportunity to thank the Secretariat and its representative here, Mr. Protitch, for having already had this document reproduced and made available to members of the Committee.

26. In this memorandum of the Soviet Government there is an extensive programme of measures on which there should be immediate agreement in order to follow up the success achieved with the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ensure progress in the field of nuclear and conventional disarmament. The proposals contained in the memorandum are based on the desires of the peace-loving States which, like the Soviet Union and other socialist States, are in favour of the prohibition and complete destruction of nuclear weapons and the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

27. The Soviet Government proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee examine, as its priority task, the question of a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, and suggests an exchange of views on the convening of an international conference to sign such a convention. This matter has been pending for a long time. The representatives of many countries in the United Nations and here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee have insisted on the urgent need to solve this problem. It is well known that a draft convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons was put forward by the Soviet Union during the twenty-second session of the

---

<sup>1/</sup> Circulated as Conference document ENDC/227.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

General Assembly, which entrusted the Eighteen-Nation Committee with the task of examining this question and suggested that States might examine this matter directly. In combination with the Treaty prohibiting nuclear tests in three environments and the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, an international convention prohibiting the use or threat of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards eliminating the danger of a nuclear war. Such an agreement would be an important deterrent to all those who might be disposed to use nuclear weapons against other States. The prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would have tremendous importance for the fate of the peoples of the world. It would facilitate the solution of many vital problems concerning the peace and security of States and would be a powerful stimulus to the accomplishment of further measures in the field of disarmament.

28. The Soviet Union, in proposing to the Eighteen-Nation Committee that it devote its attention to examining a draft convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons, considers that all the grounds exist for a positive solution of this urgent question. It is well known that the question of the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons has been debated on many occasions at sessions of the United Nations General Assembly and here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. The Declaration adopted by the United Nations in 1961 on prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weapons (resolution 1653(XVI)) stated quite definitely that the use of nuclear weapons is contrary to the spirit, letter and aims of the United Nations and is a crime against mankind. The provisions of the Declaration prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons which are concretely reflected in the Soviet draft convention must now be enshrined in a treaty and become obligatory international law.

29. The Foreign Minister of the USSR, Mr. A.A. Gromyko, in his report to the Supreme Soviet on 27 June of this year, said:

"The Soviet Union calls upon the Western Powers possessing nuclear weapons to sit down at a negotiating table in a restricted or enlarged committee with participation of other States, and to examine seriously the question of an international convention prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. Our country is prepared to sign such an international document immediately."

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

The Soviet delegation trusts that this proposal by the USSR will be debated in a constructive spirit by members of the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

30. The Soviet Union is ready also to examine the whole of the other proposals concerning nuclear disarmament and confirms its deep interest in the accomplishment of immediate measures to liquidate all existing nuclear arsenals. In the memorandum of the USSR Government it is proposed to all nuclear Powers that they immediately enter into negotiations on stopping the manufacture of nuclear weapons and on the reduction of stockpiles, to be followed by the complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Union, speaking in favour of complete nuclear disarmament, considers that the world should no longer be divided into nuclear and non-nuclear countries. A situation must be achieved where mankind will no longer be threatened by this nuclear sword of Damocles.

31. However complicated the problem of nuclear disarmament may be it must be solved, taking as a basis the businesslike and realistic approach which was used in elaborating and agreeing on the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. The Soviet delegation considers that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament must make its contribution to the solution of this important international problem, by helping with its work to achieve an agreement on the cessation of the manufacture of nuclear weapons and the destruction of all stockpiles.

32. Another important question which is on the agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament is the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests. Five years have elapsed since the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water but it still has not been possible to settle the problem of the prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon tests. The representatives of many countries were fully justified in insisting on the speediest possible agreement on this measure, demanding the complete prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests including underground nuclear explosions. The Soviet Union urges all States, and, above all, the nuclear States, immediately to solve this important problem. The Soviet Government is ready to come to an agreement immediately on the prohibition of underground nuclear tests on the basis of using national means of detection for control over this prohibition. This solution would be fully in keeping with the interests of strengthening peace and slowing down the nuclear arms race.

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

33. In its memorandum the Soviet Union proposes also coming to an agreement on some measures for the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons. In doing so, the Soviet Government bases itself on the fact that the destruction of the entire arsenal of strategic means of delivery, or at any rate the reduction of that arsenal to the absolute minimum, while allowing for the retention -- and that only temporarily -- of a strictly limited number of such means of delivery, would be a measure leading towards the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war.

34. An agreement has been reached -- and this was announced in Moscow and Washington on 1 July of this year -- on an exchange of views between the Soviet Union and the United States of America concerning a general limitation and reduction of offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles.

35. Another important measure aimed at reducing the threat of a nuclear war and easing international tension would be the adoption of a decision concerning the prohibition of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national borders and a limitation of navigation zones for rocket-carrying submarines. Every day life gives us new proof of the dangers inherent in the flights over foreign territory of bombers carrying a lethal nuclear load. In the present state of tension any accident to a bomber that led to a nuclear explosion might set in motion a whole chain of dangerous events and give rise to an international conflict endangering the whole of mankind.

36. The Soviet Union, guided by the interests of safeguarding peace, addresses an appeal to the Eighteen-Nation Committee to examine with all due attention the question of the urgent prohibition of flights beyond national borders of bombers carrying nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union also proposes, in order to reduce the danger of a nuclear war breaking out, that an agreement be reached to stop the patrolling of rocket-carrying submarines in areas from which the missiles can reach the frontiers of the contracting parties.

37. The Soviet delegation also proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should examine the question of the protection of countries and peoples against the use of weapons of mass destruction such as chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare. As is well known, at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations a special resolution was adopted containing an appeal

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

for the strict observance by all States of the principles of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 for the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological methods of warfare and condemning all actions contrary to that objective (General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI)). The resolution of the General Assembly invites all States to accede to the Geneva Protocol.

38. Since that appeal of the General Assembly has not met with the necessary response on the part of some countries, and also taking into account the serious concern of the peoples of the world in regard to the threat which the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons represents for mankind, the Soviet Union proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee should deal with this question and examine ways and means of securing the observance by all States of the Geneva Protocol of 1925.

39. Among measures aimed at reducing and eliminating the threat of a nuclear war and at easing international tension, the question of the urgent need for the elimination of foreign military bases has an important place. The existence of such bases on foreign soil is a constant threat to peace and a source of an outbreak of military conflicts. Wherever foreign military bases are located, there above all any tension results in military operations and a situation is brought about which threatens the peace of the world. The Soviet delegation proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament consider, in conformity with the instructions of the twenty-first session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, the question of the elimination of foreign military bases.

40. In speaking of measures contributing to the achievement of disarmament and the easing of international tensions, it is necessary to emphasize the importance of the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world. At previous sessions of the Committee great attention has been devoted to this question by many delegations. The interest shown in the world in the creation of nuclear-free zones has serious reasons. Possibilities are inherent in it for protecting the security of States and of whole areas of the world from the threat of a nuclear war. The Soviet Union, as we have repeatedly declared, supports the creation of nuclear-free zones in various parts of the world and considers that obligations in regard to the creation of nuclear-free zones can be assumed not only by groups of States



(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

covering whole continents or large geographical areas but also by more limited groups of States and even by individual countries. In this regard we base ourselves on the fact that the creation of nuclear-free zones would effectively limit the sphere of location of nuclear weapons and would meet the need to prevent their direct or indirect dissemination. In our view the Eighteen-Nation Committee could contribute to the achievement of an agreement in this field.

41. The Soviet Union also supports the proposal concerning measures for the regional limitation of armaments and regional disarmament, in particular in the Near East. The question of such measures in that region could, of course, be examined only after the liquidation of the consequences of Israeli aggression against Arab countries and, above all, after the complete withdrawal of Israeli troops from the territories of Arab countries occupied by them.

42. The Committee also has before it the question of an agreement on the peaceful use of the sea-bed and ocean floor. This question is of great importance from the point of view of excluding the aforesaid sphere from any possible military preparations. The Soviet delegation proposes that the Eighteen-Nation Committee undertake negotiations in this field with a view to ensuring the use of the sea-bed beyond the limits of present territorial waters exclusively for peaceful purposes. The purpose of negotiations on this wide range of concrete measures in the field of disarmament is the accomplishment of our fundamental and main task -- general and complete disarmament. The Soviet Government deems it necessary to resuscitate the negotiations on these problems in the Eighteen-Nation Committee.

43. In presenting to the participants in this Conference the memorandum of the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament the Soviet delegation hopes that the proposals contained in that memorandum will be the subject of a thorough and constructive examination in the Eighteen-Nation Committee. Those proposals constitute a wide basis for further all-round negotiations on disarmament for the consolidation, development and expansion of the success achieved as a result of the conclusion of the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. An agreement on and the implementation of any of the disarmament measures proposed in the memorandum of the Government of the Soviet Union would be a further contribution to the solution of the problem of the international security of all States, including

(Mr. Roshchin, USSR)

non-nuclear States. Thus this problem, which claims the attention of a large number of States, would be given further development for the welfare of all the countries of the world.

44. For its part, the Soviet delegation will make the utmost effort to contribute to the success of the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee in carrying out this task, and it urges all the participants in this Conference in their turn to do everything possible so that the work of the Committee may be successful and make a new contribution to the strengthening of peace and the security of peoples.

45. Mr. FOSTER (United States of America): I should like first to welcome our old friend, Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General. On behalf of my delegation I ask him to convey our appreciation to the Secretary-General of the United Nations Office in Europe, and I hope that he will be with us from time to time in these meetings. I also welcome Mr. Epstein, the Deputy Special Representative, who has contributed so much to our work over the years.

46. Next may I congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on the constructive remarks you made in opening this meeting. I believe they will help in launching this Committee on another successful session.

47. There are several new faces among us today for the first time. We welcome the representative of Burma. The representative of Poland we have known in another activity and we are very happy to greet him as the leader of the Polish delegation.

48. I join with my co-Chairman in welcoming back the representative of Brazil, Mr. Azeredo da Silveira, and the representative of Mexico, Mr. Castaneda.

49. Finally, let me greet all our old friends who are here again, friends with whom we have worked around this table or the table in the Council Chamber for many years. I think it is fair to say that during the last year or year and a half our efforts, arduous and long as they have been, have been crowned with considerable success. In the opinion of my delegation, the treaty that has been produced by those efforts goes further towards putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle than any other step which the world has taken since that genie got out almost twenty-five years ago.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

50. Much has been said here about the perils of proliferation and I will not repeat what has been said. To deal with these perils was the original purpose of this treaty. The fact that more than sixty nations have already signed it augurs well for its success on this score. But the treaty has purposes going far beyond proliferation. It is with two of these that I would like to deal today.

51. First, the treaty lays an indispensable foundation for expanded co-operation in the peaceful application of nuclear energy. In this connexion let me call to the attention of the Committee the statement which President Johnson made when the treaty was opened for signature in Washington on 1 July:

"We will co-operate fully to bring the treaty safeguards into being. We shall thus help provide the basis of confidence necessary for increased co-operation in the peaceful nuclear field. After the treaty has come into force we will permit the International Atomic Energy Agency to apply its safeguards to all nuclear activities in the United States -- excluding only those with direct national security significance. Thus, the United States is not asking any country to accept any safeguards we are not willing to accept ourselves.

"As the treaty requires, we shall also engage in the fullest possible exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The needs of the developing nations will be given particular attention.

"We shall make readily available to the non-nuclear treaty partners the benefits of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. And we shall do so without delay and under the treaty's provisions."

52. A second prime purpose of the non-proliferation treaty which I wish to discuss today is contained in article VI, the obligation to negotiate in good faith to halt the nuclear arms race and toward nuclear disarmament.

53. In this connexion, I would like to read a message which President Johnson has today addressed to our Committee:

"Your Conference has achieved singular success in negotiating the non-proliferation treaty. The treaty is a major step toward a goal which the United States has been seeking since the dawn of the nuclear age. It is a triumph of sanity in international affairs and a testament to man's will to survive.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

"The world looks today for a beginning of the negotiations called for by the treaty -- 'negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament...'

"This is the most pressing task which the treaty lays on its parties, and the nations meeting in Geneva today share a major responsibility in performing it. The United States takes this responsibility with the utmost seriousness.

"High on the disarmament agenda of mankind is the need to halt the strategic arms race. Agreement has been reached between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States to enter in the nearest future into bilateral discussions on the limitation and the reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles. It is expected that the two sides will shortly reach a decision on the time and place for talks.

"In the absence of agreement, the nuclear arms race could escalate to new levels. This would only result in higher and higher destructive power on each side and vast diversion of resources from peaceful pursuits -- with no increase in security for anyone.

"If we can make progress on limiting strategic delivery systems, the United States would be prepared to consider reductions of existing systems. By reducing these systems, we would cut back effectively -- and for the first time -- on the vast potentials for destruction which each side possesses.

"The United States and the Soviet Union have a special responsibility to head off a strategic arms race. The fate of mankind could well depend on the manner in which our two nations discharge that responsibility.

"Progress on limiting strategic delivery systems will also facilitate the achievement of various related measures of nuclear arms control and disarmament. A number of such measures has been suggested by the United States. Additional measures have been proposed by other nations and recommended by the General Assembly of the United Nations. The United States hopes that your Conference will soon be able to make significant progress on measures which have been the subject of past discussions. But these are not the only subjects of interest to the Conference.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

"We must soon take up the question of arms limitations on the seabed in the light of the consideration being given by the General Assembly's Ad Hoc Committee on the Seabeds to a number of proposals for arms limitations on the seabed. Your Conference should begin to define those factors vital to a workable, verifiable and effective international agreement which would prevent the use of this new environment for the emplacement of weapons of mass destruction.

"Meaning must soon be given to the language of the non-proliferation treaty dealing with sharing potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear explosions. In the view of the United States, the International Atomic Energy Agency is the 'appropriate international body' through which the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty may obtain these benefits under article V of the treaty if they choose to do so. We also believe that the IAEA is the appropriate forum for development of procedures and agreements relating to the furnishing of the peaceful nuclear explosive services obtained through the IAEA.

"Finally, we must be alert to opportunities for achieving regional limitations on armaments. We have seen that co-operation at the regional level to limit armaments not only is possible but is in fact a promising path to progress. The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a worthy example of what can be achieved when neighbours collaborate in safeguarding their national security interests and in promoting their common welfare. In signing protocol II of the Treaty of Tlatelolco, the United States has demonstrated its intention to respect the denuclearized status of Latin America which will be established by that Treaty. We hope that all nuclear Powers will respect this great achievement of Latin American diplomacy.

"We have also seen the consequences of the failure of nations to effect regional arrangements to inhibit the growth of arsenals of conventional weapons. Resources continue to be diverted from critical human needs to the acquisition of armaments and the maintenance of military establishments that in themselves feed fears and create insecurity among nations.

(Mr. Foster, United States)

"The United States attaches particular importance to halting non-nuclear arms races. We must achieve regional limitations on conventional armaments.

"Representatives of the United States are under standing instructions to search out any initiatives for regional restraints coming from the areas concerned. If arrangements acceptable to the nations involved can be concluded, they will be respected by the United States. We stand ready to support any reasonable measure affecting the activities of the major weapons-producers that would make a regional agreement more effective, including a requirement that suppliers publicize or register their arms shipments to a particular region." (ENDC/228)

54. As President Johnson's message points out, the most pressing task the non-proliferation treaty lays on its parties is to pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and to achieve nuclear disarmament. These objectives now become the agreed national goals of all those who adhere to its terms. It provides periodic review conferences to see that progress towards these goals is achieved. It lays a firm foundation for a new era in disarmament negotiations. As the body with responsibility for its achievement, the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament has an important role in carrying the world forward into this era. Thus our task is laid out for us.

55. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): First, I have the honour and privilege to convey to the Committee a message addressed to it today by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P. The message reads:

"At its last session the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee's long and patient labours on the non-proliferation treaty were finally crowned with success and with the opening of the treaty for signature the Committee will be free to turn its attention to other measures of arms control and disarmament. This is a tremendous opportunity which must be exploited to the full. I am sure the Disarmament Committee will be equal to its responsibilities and trust that in its present session it will initiate work that will enable further steps to be taken on the long road that leads to general and complete disarmament."

I should be grateful if that message could be circulated as a Conference document.<sup>1/</sup>

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

56. I should like to join you, Mr. Chairman, and previous speakers in welcoming Mr. Protitch, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General, and would ask him to convey to the Secretary-General our appreciation of his message to the Committee. I should like also to congratulate you, Mr. Chairman, on your introductory remarks today and to assure you that my delegation fully shares your hopes for the progress of this session. May I also express my pleasure at meeting again around this table so many friends from our previous sessions, welcome back the Ambassadors of Brazil and Mexico and extend a warm welcome to the Ambassadors of Burma and Poland, who are joining us for the first time.

57. I am very grateful to have the privilege of speaking at an early stage in what I believe is to be a crucial, if unavoidably short, session of our Committee.

58. Since I was charged by my Government a little over a year ago with special responsibilities for disarmament we have been almost exclusively occupied, here and in New York, with consideration of the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226). We can, I think without undue lack of modesty take a considerable pride in the fact that the treaty has now been commended by a very large vote in the General Assembly and has been opened for signature. As my Prime Minister said on the occasion of the signing: "It is the most important measure of arms control yet to be negotiated." More than sixty nations have signed in the first few days and I hope other States will soon sign and that ratifications will follow in a steady stream so that the treaty will enter into force as soon as possible. This is the desire of my Government and it is our intention to ratify at an early date.

59. This, however, is not the end of the story as inevitably problems remain and much work needs to be done before the treaty can be fully effective. In particular, the safeguards agreements will have to be negotiated. It is most important that the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) should tackle as a matter of urgency the vital tasks envisaged for it in the non-proliferation treaty. I hope that all members of this Committee will endorse this view. This work will have to be done in Vienna, of course. We shall wish to take a close interest in progress there and also follow up the provisions of article V, about which I shall say something later. But our major task now is to explore all the possibilities for further measures of arms control and disarmament that are opened up by the treaty.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

60. Indeed we have an obligation to do so under the terms of article VI and the preamble to the treaty itself. It will be within the recollection of representatives around this table that in fact from the early days of our discussion here many countries made their support for the treaty conditional on its being followed by meaningful negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and by progress towards general and complete disarmament. I did not disguise my own feeling that while the treaty was a most important step forward, and valuable in itself, it was even more important as an essential precondition of further measures. Some went further and argued that such progress should have preceded the coming into force of the treaty, and accordingly we must expect that the rate of ratifications of the treaty may well be greatly influenced by the rate of our work here. But whatever the argument on this issue in the past there can surely be no dissent today from the proposition that we must make progress, and be seen to be making progress, in the direction so clearly sign-posted in the treaty itself, to which all nations which adhere to it are fully committed.

61. In one sense we are now charged with drawing up an agenda, thus establishing priorities for our work. But equally important, with the eyes of the world focused on our deliberations, we need to make an impact, to establish disarmament firmly in the middle of the international stage so that people may believe in it again. We must check the feeling that we have lost control of our destiny and are allowing a major part of our scientific potential and a disproportionate share of our total resources to be used to ensure our ultimate and horrible destruction. I hope the Committee will excuse my intemperate passion in these matters although I do not apologise for it; I happen to believe very strongly in what I am trying to do.

62. In short, we have to get off to a good start and completely dismiss from our minds any idea, if such exists, that we can proceed at a leisurely tempo with one topic under consideration and allow another five years to pass before reaching agreement on a further major measure as happened between the partial test ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) and the non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/226).

63. In this sense I welcome the memorandum circulated by the Soviet Government two weeks ago (ENDC/227). This is undergoing urgent and full study by my Government and I offer now only some preliminary comments upon it. We are indebted to the representative of the Soviet Union, Ambassador Roshchin, for his comments on it today which we shall study with care also.



(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

64. We welcome unreservedly the inclusion of item 2, measures on stopping the production of nuclear weapons and on the reduction and elimination of stockpiles of these weapons; item 3, the limitation and subsequent reduction of strategic means of delivery of nuclear weapons; and item 5, the ban on underground tests.

65. We are very glad that the Soviet Union gives priority to these subjects and we are even more encouraged by the fact that they and the United States have agreed to start in the very near future talks on the whole question of limiting and reducing offensive and defensive nuclear missile systems. These three items in the Soviet memorandum form an indivisible complex and should all be pursued energetically.

66. We also welcome the positive approach of the United States, of which we have received evidence again today from the remarks of its representative, Ambassador Foster, and the message addressed to us by President Johnson. In passing may I say how good it is to see our co-Chairmen, to whom we owe so much for the successful outcome of the non-proliferation negotiations, looking fit, a little refreshed I hope from their past labours, and I am sure as dedicated and determined as ever to move forward and make progress.

67. In our view if progress is to be made on nuclear disarmament, as it must be, a great deal depends upon bilateral negotiations between the two nuclear super-Powers. Nevertheless, the rest of us may be able to make useful suggestions and we ourselves hope to make a full contribution in this field and stand ready to help in any way we can.

68. If I may be forgiven for a lapse into the tedious habit of quoting one's own speeches, I should like to remind the Committee of what I said at the beginning of the General Assembly debate, on 1 May:

"We meet against a background of a world in tension, at a time when the development of anti-ballistic missiles threatens an increased impetus to the nuclear arms race, not its cessation. It is a responsibility for all of us to do what we can to abate the temperature; but it is, of course, particularly a responsibility for the two major nuclear Powers, the two co-Chairmen of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee. I believe that they recognize their special responsibilities, and that this draft treaty is a manifestation of their concern to do something positive to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

"I cannot prove their sincerity. An act of faith rather than objective data is required. I accept that when they pledge themselves to pursue negotiations in good faith to end the arms race at an early date they mean what they say. Equally, it is the duty of the rest of us to do all in our power to play our part and see that these pledges are fulfilled."

(A/C.1/PV.1558, p.6).

69. I see the good news of the forthcoming negotiations as a further manifestation of good intentions on the part of the two major nuclear Powers. We have been immensely encouraged by it and fervently hope that it may soon bring fruitful results. But equally, while we are encouraged by that development, the whole world will be downcast if there is delay, procrastination or, even worse, failure in this hopeful development which makes us think that at last the international clouds are beginning to roll away.

70. If I may now return to my brief preliminary comments on the Soviet memorandum, the Committee may not be surprised to hear that I do not share the Soviet view that first priority should be given to the conclusion of an international agreement banning the use of nuclear weapons. My Government strongly supports all efforts to remove the danger of nuclear war. That is indeed one of the basic considerations underlying our whole approach to the question of progress in the disarmament field. But we do not believe that the danger of nuclear war can be eliminated by a simple prohibition on the use of the weapons concerned. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the danger of nuclear war will also exist; and in the event of war between the nuclear Powers, it is only realistic to recognize that nuclear weapons will probably be used notwithstanding any prohibitions that might have been agreed beforehand. A prohibition on the use of nuclear weapons, even if it could be enforced -- which of course, it cannot -- would not in our view contribute to security; it could well impair it by creating the false impression that aggressive action could be undertaken without risking nuclear war: we are not concerned only with the prevention of nuclear war but with the prevention of war in all its forms.

71. For all those reasons my Government believes that the only sure way to remove the danger of nuclear war is by general and complete disarmament under effective international control. Every arms control measure that can be agreed in the meantime is a step towards that objective.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

72. Equally we do not think that the Committee would be profitably employed in discussing items 4 and 7 of the Soviet memorandum, which suggest the prohibition of flights of bombers carrying nuclear weapons beyond national boundaries, and the limitation of zones of operation of missile-carrying submarines and the dismantling of foreign military bases.

73. We agree that the other items, which I have not mentioned, are matters to which consideration should be given, namely, measures for regional disarmament, the use of the sea bed -- a complex but very important subject -- and the prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons. On the last point I shall have some proposals to make later in my speech which go rather further than those contained in item 6 of the Soviet memorandum.

74. I turn now to my own proposals. In the nuclear field my own priority is a ban on underground tests, and we have given particular thought ourselves to the problems of a comprehensive test ban treaty. Obviously the banning of underground nuclear tests is closely related to any agreement on the limitation of offensive and defensive nuclear weapons and an associated cut-off of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons, but it seems to us to be a measure of cardinal importance because we think that the real danger of vertical proliferation lies in the development of more sophisticated weapons systems. Purely quantitative control will achieve nothing if the nuclear weapons that are permitted become more and more costly and more and more deadly. The merit of a comprehensive test ban treaty is just this, that it would prevent the development of more sophisticated weapons systems.

75. The principal avowed obstacle in the way of a comprehensive test ban treaty is the problem of on-site inspection. Obviously, if there is a treaty parties must be able to satisfy themselves that the obligations imposed by the treaty are being fulfilled. Since this question of on-site inspection first became a bone of contention, the means of identifying incidents as earthquakes or explosions have been greatly improved, but it is difficult to see how a complaint by one party that the treaty had been infringed could be substantiated without on-site inspection.

76. The Soviet Union has consistently opposed the whole principle of on-site inspection. We can understand fears that such inspections might provide opportunities for espionage, but we think that those fears might be dispelled if arrangements could be made by which on-site inspection could take place only if there were strongly seismological or other evidence that the treaty had been infringed. I should therefore

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

like to suggest that consideration be given to the possibility of the treaty's providing for a special committee whose function it would be to consider complaints of infringements of the treaty and assess the evidence produced in support of the complaint. Such a committee might be composed of the representatives of the three nuclear-weapon States parties to the treaty, the representatives of three non-aligned countries and a nominee of the United Nations Secretary-General or the Director-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency. There should be the right of on-site inspection if the Committee decided by a majority of five to two that a prima facie case had been made out in support of the complaint. Our thought is that a committee of this composition would be able to carry out on-site inspection only if there were very strong evidence that the treaty had been infringed. The necessary majority could never be achieved if there were a mere suspicion that an unauthorized nuclear explosion might have taken place. That should help to obviate all possibility of unnecessary on-site inspection and so rule out all fears of its improper use.

77. As I have already indicated, the question of a comprehensive test ban is closely linked with agreement on the cut-off of production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and with the limitation and subsequent reduction of offensive and defensive nuclear delivery vehicles, but there is a difference between the comprehensive test ban and these other measures -- the difference between a continuing process and a once-for-all event. The comprehensive test ban has been generally thought of as a once-for-all event, an agreement that up to a certain date there should be complete freedom to conduct any number of underground nuclear weapon tests of any size but that after that date no tests at all should be permitted. We have been wondering whether the comprehensive test ban itself might not be made a phased operation by starting with an agreed annual quota of underground weapon tests explosions. We feel that it might be possible for the treaty to provide for quotas on a descending scale over a period of, say, four or five years, ending with a nil quota after which further tests would be banned absolutely. Alternatively, the quotas might not be written into the treaty but fixed annually, possibly by a committee of the kind I have already suggested.

78. Those two suggestions for a committee and a quota system are not alternative but complementary since, if a quota system were established, machinery would still be needed to ensure that the quota was not exceeded. I have used the word "suggestions" and that is what I mean. We have not worked out full details and these are certainly not formal proposals, but I shall be glad to hear the reactions of my colleagues on this Committee in due course and I hope that our co-Chairmen in particular will give these suggestions their serious consideration.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

79. It is obviously the general wish that any comprehensive test ban treaty should be flexible enough to permit peaceful nuclear explosions. I do not intend today to make suggestions about how that could be achieved, but I should like to say something at this point about article V of the non-proliferation treaty.

80. It was clear from the debate in the General Assembly that a number of countries were thinking in terms of an international agreement, presumably between the parties to the non-proliferation treaty, which would vest in one single body the power to supervise the implementation of article V. It was also clear that many countries were thinking in terms of a new international organization for that purpose, I do not think that this is the right approach. The creation of a new international body would be enormously wasteful both of manpower and of money. It is unlikely that any nuclear explosions will be conducted under article V for several years, and thereafter the international body would be engaged in only intermittent activity. There is everything to be said for letting as much of the job as possible be done by the IAEA, but if the IAEA is to be the main instrument for implementing the provisions of article V, that will govern the character of the international agreement or agreements envisaged therein. The requirement would seem to be for tripartite project agreements between the IAEA and the two states concerned in a particular project, rather than a general international agreement, since parties to a general international agreement on article V could not impose duties on the IAEA, which is an independent international organization.

81. It is not for us to discuss what part the IAEA could play in implementing article V, over and above the health and safety aspects with which it is obviously qualified to deal, but I hope that in August it can be agreed that the co-Chairmen should write on behalf of our Committee to the Chairman of the IAEA Board of Governors asking him to arrange for the IAEA to study and in due course to report on the part it might play in implementing article V. We should not ask it to do more than study and report at this stage. We can then return to this problem equipped with the information we need to carry out the obligation imposed by article V:

"Negotiations on this subject shall commence as soon as possible after the Treaty enters into force." (ENDC/226)

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

82. Before leaving nuclear disarmament measures I should like to say a word about nuclear-free zones. These present another possibility for progress and equally deserve our support although depending for their negotiation on the initiative of countries in the area concerned. My Government strongly supports such initiatives and it is a matter of great satisfaction to me that we were the first nuclear Power to sign the protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco (ENDC/186) last year. We hope to see further groups of States follow the outstanding example set by the Latin American States.

83. I have so far concerned myself with arms control and disarmament measures in the field of nuclear weapons. There can be no doubt of the overriding importance of this aspect of our work. However, I believe it would be wrong to confine ourselves exclusively to nuclear matters in the weeks and months ahead. Peace and enhanced security will come equally from a general reduction of non-nuclear armaments. Conventional weapons and forces indeed represent a high proportion of the burden of defence which afflicts us all. We all, rich countries and poor countries alike, spend money and resources on defence forces which we can ill afford and which could be so much better devoted to other things. We must devise ways of increasing our security at the same time as reducing the crippling and growing expenditure on armaments.

84. Although primarily the concern of the countries in the area and not that of this Committee, regional arrangements for arms control and disarmament offer great scope. We should all do what we can to assist their development. Most member nations here have accepted my invitation to send representatives to visit the conventional arms control verification exercise, "First Look", which we are currently carrying out in England jointly with the United States Government. Proper verification techniques are an essential ingredient of any agreement to limit the size of forces and I hope therefore that the experience gained in this exercise will be of value to the Committee and serve as a stimulus to more interest and progress in this field. I need hardly say, of course, that we are ready to make available to the Committee full information on the exercise and the conclusions which can be drawn from it.

85. In this context I should like to recall that, as recorded in the communiqué issued after the ministerial meeting in Reykjavik last month, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is undertaking an intensive programme of study of disarmament and practical arms control measures. We are concentrating as an initial effort on the study of the

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

possibility of balanced force reductions between East and West. We believe that it would be in all our interests to try to maintain the balance at a lower level of forces. It is our earnest hope that the work now being done on this subject within the Alliance will in due course lead to international progress on arms control on the continent of Europe.

86. Another particular aspect of conventional disarmament problems to which my Government has devoted much thought is that of the international trade in arms. The British Government would welcome international agreement on effective measures to control the arms trade. We have given careful study to the problems involved and the best way to make progress. Nothing would be gained by minimizing the difficulties that would have to be overcome in working out acceptable international arrangements. Moreover, effective implementation of an international agreement on arms supplies would require the active support of all major supplying countries; otherwise those participating in the agreement would be putting themselves at an economic and political disadvantage. But I do earnestly suggest that this is another subject for which the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should find a place on its agenda.

87. However, my own priority for action in the non-nuclear field concerns chemical and biological warfare. This is the last subject I want to deal with this afternoon. Some countries claim that nothing more is needed in this field than that all States should adhere to the 1925 Geneva Protocol prohibiting the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons and strictly observe its principles. I recall the resolution of the General Assembly on this subject in the twenty-first session (General Assembly resolution 2162 B (XXI)) and, of course, would like to see all countries which have not done so already ratify the Protocol. But I cannot agree that this is all that is needed, and there are three points to which I would draw attention. The first is that the States which are parties to the Protocol -- I think there are fifty-four of them -- have not all undertaken exactly the same obligations. Many of them, including the United Kingdom, have reserved the right to use chemical and biological weapons against non-parties and violators of the Protocol. Secondly, even if all States were to accede to the Protocol there would still be a risk of large-scale use of the proscribed weapons as long as States have the right to manufacture such weapons and to use them against violators. Thirdly, there is no consensus on the meaning of the term "gases" in the phrase "asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices". The French and English versions of the Protocol do

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

not correspond exactly and this has led to disagreement on whether non-lethal gases are covered by the Protocol. It is also argued that the term "bacteriological" as used in the Protocol is not sufficiently comprehensive to include the whole range of possible biological agents of warfare. Unhappily there have been considerable developments in both the chemical and biological means of warfare in the forty-three years since the Protocol was concluded.

88. This suggests that there is a strong case for either revising the Geneva Protocol or trying to negotiate some additional instrument to clarify and strengthen its provisions while keeping the Protocol itself in being.

89. My preference is for the latter course and my Government has for some considerable time been studying the problems involved. These studies will be finalized shortly and I hope then to put some positive and specific proposals before the Committee with a suggestion that it adopt them as a basis for consideration with a view to taking action in this field at an early date.

90. The problems involved in seeking to go beyond the Geneva Protocol seem greater, and international opinion less clear, in the field of chemical weapons than in that of biological weapons. The former have already been used in war with terrible effect. The latter have never been used but they are generally regarded with even greater abhorrence, if that be possible.

91. It seems, therefore, that one answer may be to make a distinction between chemical and biological weapons in our approach to the problems involved. I would like to suggest that we should try to go beyond the Geneva Protocol for both chemical and biological warfare, but I think it may be easier first to tackle agents of biological warfare and seek to conclude an instrument on biological warfare which would go beyond the Geneva Protocol and actually ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare. I am confident that such a step would command very wide, if not universal, support from the peoples of the world. I make this declaration of intent today because I believe it is necessary to indicate the importance we attach to early action on this subject, and also to canvass the opinions of members of the Committee. I recognize that the question



(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

of verification in this field presents particular difficulties but I expect to be able to make proposals bearing on this aspect of the problem. I hope to submit a working paper which may serve as a basis for the full and serious consideration which I am sure the Committee will wish to give to this subject.

92. As far as chemical warfare is concerned I think we must rest content for the moment with the Geneva Protocol. As an aid to further action, however, I would take up a proposal contained in the draft resolution submitted by the Maltese delegation at the last session of the United Nations General Assembly and suggest that our co-Chairmen on behalf of this Committee should request the Secretary-General to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use, with a view to giving this Committee an international scientific basis for future consideration of further measures for their limitation and control, as well as focusing public opinion on the issues involved. This would follow the precedent of the recent very valuable report (A/6858) on the effects of the possible use of nuclear weapons which has been so often quoted in our discussions. The British Government would be willing, of course, to play a full part in the preparation of such a report.

93. I conclude by summing up my proposals as follows:

first, that the co-Chairmen, on behalf of the Committee, in the very near future should request:

- (a) the Chairman of the Board of the International Atomic Energy Agency to prepare a report for our guidance on the action it could take to assist in the implementation of article V of the non-proliferation treaty, and
- (b) the Secretary-General of the United Nations to prepare a report on the nature and possible effects of chemical weapons and on the implications of their use;

second, that the Committee should accord priority in its work to the preparation of a comprehensive test-ban treaty and that the problem of on-site inspections be considered along the lines I have suggested; and

third, that priority in the non-nuclear field be accorded to an instrument to ban the production and possession of agents of biological warfare.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

94. In this Committee we are engaged upon the most important work in the world. We must put disarmament back on the international map. On behalf of my Government I undertake that we will do all in our power to assist the Committee to make substantial and speedy progress.

95. Mr. JAROSZEK (Poland): I have asked to speak in order to express my thanks to you, Mr. Chairman, for the kind words of welcome contained in your opening address. My sincere thanks go also to the co-Chairmen of our Committee -- the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Roshchin, and the representative of the United States, Mr. Foster -- as well as to the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Mulley. Your kind words are an encouragement to me in the fulfilment of the new and responsible tasks facing me in this Committee. I consider it an honour indeed to participate with so many distinguished representatives in the work of this very important United Nations body. I can assure you that the Polish delegation will spare no effort to contribute in a constructive way and in a spirit of co-operation to the fruitful deliberations of this Committee and to the successful results of its work.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 381st plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Afework Zelleke, representative of Ethiopia.

"The Special Representative of the Secretary-General made a statement and conveyed a message to the Conference from the Secretary-General.

"The Chairman also made a statement.

"After the conclusion of the open part of the meeting, statements were made by the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States, the United Kingdom and Poland.

"The following documents were submitted:

(Mr. Jaroszek, Poland)

1. Letter dated 20 June 1968 from the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the co-Chairmen of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament transmitting resolutions 2373 (XXII) of the General Assembly and 225 (1968) of the Security Council (ENDC/226);
  2. Memorandum by the Government of the USSR on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament (ENDC/227);
  3. Message from President Johnson to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament (ENDC/228)
  4. Message to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament from the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the Right Honourable Harold Wilson, M.P. (ENDC/229).
- "The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 18 July 1968, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 4.40 p.m.

